The late 1990s will likely be remembered as one of the greatest periods of corporate excess iti Americati history. Alleged misuse of corporate loans to executives at companies such as Tyco and Enron typify agency problems with the iirm and are often cited as evidence ofa failure of corporate governance. However, a significant proportion of these loans are specifically for purposes of acquiring company stock and increasing managerial ownership.
Insider acquisitions of shares are supposed to align the interests of managers and shareholders. Thus, purchases are typically viewed as positive signals. However, if the transactions do not put insiders 'wealth at risk, perhaps this conclusion is premature. We test this idea by focusing on loan financing of insider share acquisitions. We find that loan-financed insider purchases and option exercises earn lower profits than do counterparts that are not loan financed. Our results also suggest that loan-financed insider purchases are an additional method to move an executive quickly to a target level of incentives.
The late 1990s will likely be remembered as one of the greatest periods of corporate excess iti Americati history. Alleged misuse of corporate loans to executives at companies such as Tyco and Enron typify agency problems with the iirm and are often cited as evidence ofa failure of corporate governance. However, a significant proportion of these loans are specifically for purposes of acquiring company stock and increasing managerial ownership.
In this paper we examine insider purchases of stock that are financed by loans from the insider's firm and test whether these loans harm uninformed shareholders. Numerous studies suggest that insiders' trading activities act as signals about the value of their firm. Results in Jaffe (1974) , Finnerty (1976) , Seyhun (1986) , and Pettit and Venkatesh (1995) support the argument that insiders have access to information about future performance that outside investors do not have, and that insiders are likely to trade in a direction that is consistent with this private information. Nevertheless, it is well-recognized that the above results refiect average behavior and that not all insiders' transactions refiect private information. We argue that loan-financed purchases are less likely to represent attempts to profit from inside information. Consequently, the retums to loan-financed insider purchases should be less positive than the retums following purchases that are not financed by company loans.
We also examine insiders' option exercises, since share acquisitions can occur through either open market purchases or option exercises. As with loan-financed purchases, we expect loan-financed option exercises to show lower retums than exercises that are not financed by company loans. However, one difference between loan-financed stock purchases and loan-financed option exercises is that insiders might exercise options and then sell the acquired shares on the open market. To control for this possibility, we distinguish between option exercises that are followed by insider sales and those that are not.
A. The Profitability of Insider Purchases
Early work examining the profitability of insider trading generally finds that insiders earn significant excess retums on their trades (Lorie and Niederhoffer, 1968; Jaffe, 1974; and Finnerty, 1976) . However, the results are typically stronger for insider purchases than for sales. This evidence is consistent with a higher likelihood that insider sales (versus purchases) are for liquidity purposes, which motivates our focus on insider share acquisition activity. More recent evidence also suggests that purchases, but not sales, are informative. Seyhun (1998) finds that sales are less informative than purchases and that the profitability of sales declined in the 1990s. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find that insider purchases are useful in predicting market movements, but insider sales are not.
One potential explanation for the minimal profits above transaction costs is that these studies typically examine all open market purchases and sales by officers and directors ofthe firm. Many of these trades might not be motivated by a desire to profit irom inside information. Certainly, the common finding of weaker results for sales is consistent with this notion, since sales are more likely to be undertaken for liquidity reasons than purchases. To discriminate between insider purchases that are motivated by a desire to profit from private information and those that are not, we examine the source of fijnding for the purchase. This examination underlies our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis (la):
Insider purchases funded by company loans should be less profitable than purchases not funded by loans.
The main arguments that support our hypothesis are that corporate monitoring of insider trades and the possibility of ex post settling up cause insiders to abstain from using company loans to exploit uninformed shareholders. In many companies, insider trading is subject to the company's code of ethics and is monitored by the corporate secretary or legal counsel.^ We expect such monitoring to be more stringent for insider purchases financed by company loans, as shareholders would be extremely displeased to learn that not only had insiders exploited access to material inside information, but that it was shareholders' money, by way of a loan, that financed the transaction. In addition, insiders would have less incentive to trade on private information using loan-financed purchases if these actions are likely to lead to legal sanctions (Seyhun, 1992 and Garfinkel, 1997) .Î n terms of ex post settling up and the market for managers, previous work has shown that performance and reputation affect the internal and external labor market for both executives and directors (see evidence in Gilson (1989 Gilson ( , 1990 ) on bankruptcy; Kaplan and Reishus (1990) on dividends, and Brickley, Linck, and Coles (1999) on stock and accounting perfonnance.) In this context, firms would be less receptive to employing an executive who had exploited shareholders in a previous managerial or directorial position. This implies that managers would avoid exploiting insider information when using company money because ofthe potential for severe labor market consequences. These arguments suggest that insider purchases financed by company loans would be less profitable than purchases not funded by loans, and that loan-financed purchases in which the loan is forgiven should be less profitable than purchases in which the loan is not forgiven. See Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000) for details on enforeement ofcompany policies on insider trading. 'Seyhun presents a model in which an increase in the probability of sanctions related to insider trading reduces the positive relation between insider private information and shares traded. This result suggests that the profitability of insider trades should be reduced if higher profits earned on insider trades increases the probability of sanctions. In the context ofcompany loan-financed insider purchases, this argument suggests that these purchases would be less profitable than ones that are not funded by loans.
Alternatively, our hypothesis also receives support from the behavioral finance literature. The prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggests that investors view the disutility ofa loss to be much larger than the utility ofa gain ofthe same magnitude. This implies that insiders who trade using their own money would need to be compensated for their potehtial loss from purchasing the stock with a much larger potential gain, compared to those who purchase stock using a company loan that could potentially be forgiven.
A similar argument in support of our hypothesis can be made by appealing to the house money effect suggested in Thaler and Johnson (1990) , in which people are more willing to take risks with money they obtain easily or unexpectedly. Again, ifone were to argue that insider purchases financed by company loans fall into this category as compared to a purchase financed by their own funds, one would expect the former to be less profitable than the latter.
The above hypotheses also suggest that forgivable loans and non-repaid loans further reduce the incentive of insiders to exploit uninformed shareholders and expose the insider to less downside risk than loans that are not, leading to our second hypothesis:
The profitability of purchases should be lower for trades funded by forgivable loans and non-repaid loans.
B.The Profitability of Option Exercises
While numerous studies have found that insider purchases are informative, few papers have examined the profitability of option exercises. Seyhun (1998) finds that retums after option exercise are slightly positive fi-om 1975-1994, but slightly negative if restricted to top executives after 1991. Carpenter and Remmers (2001) examine whether insiders use private infonnation to time the exercise of executive stock options. They find little evidence of timing after May 1991, when the SEC changed the starting date of Section 16(b)'s six-month short-swing rule from the exercise date to the grant date of the option, thus allowing insiders to immediately sell shares acquired through exercise. Carpenter and Remmers (2001) argue that if insiders can sell shares immediately after exercise, then option exercises are like sales in that they allow insiders to reduce their exposure to their firm's stock. Thus exercises, like sales, might be driven mainly by liquidity needs rather than infonnation and are generally uninformative.
We contribute to this literature by examining retums following option exercises, disaggregated by whether they are loan funded, which should affect the incentive to eam profits.
Hypothesis (2a):
As in the case of stock purchases, we predict that option exercises financed by executive loans will be associated with lower ex-post excess retums than non-loan-financed option exercises.
One potential problem with the above hypothesis is that when option exercises are not loanfinanced, insiders might have to sell at least some of the shares obtained on exercise to pay the exercise price or the taxes on the profit, regardless ofthe ex-post stock retum. In this case, we might find no difference in the ex-post abnormal retums across the two groups. To disentangle these two effects, we pay additional attention to option exercises that are not followed by insider sales. We then discriminate between loan-funded and non-loan-funded option exercises for this subsample, and ascertain whether the loan reduces the incentive to eam positive excess returns on the option exercise.
Hypothesis (2b):
Following Hypothesis (lb), we expect forgivable and non-repaid loans for option exercises that are not followed by open market insider sales will be associated with lower ex-post excess retums than their non-loan-financed counterparts.
C. Pay-Performance Sensitivity
Recently, there has been increased focus on the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of managers' stock and option holdings. Over time, managerial incentives deviate from their optima due to shifts in optimal levels or changes in the incentives provided by managers' portfolios. Core and Guay (1999) find that firms use annual grants of options and restricted stock to CEOs to manage the optimal level of equity incentives. Li (2002) finds evidence that firms and managers coordinate their equity grant and portfolio rebalancing decisions to maintain optimal CEO incentive levels. Studies also examine the effect of option repricing on CEO incentives. Rogers (2005) and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2005) conclude that firms reprice stock options to reduce the risk-taking incentives of managers and move managerial incentives closer to target incentive levels. Taken together, the PPS literature suggests that managerial incentives can be optimized through adjustments to equity-based compensation.
In this context, we argue that providing loans to insiders for purchasing stock or exercising options is an additional mechanism, beyond stock and option grants/repricing, to move an executive quickly to a target level of incentives. This argument motivates our final hypothesis.
Hypothesis (3):
Insiders receiving company loans for the purpose of purchasing stock have pay-performance sensitivities prior to the awarding ofthe loan that is below what is optimal.
II. Data and Methodology
Our sample begins with all companies on Standard and Poor's ExecuComp database with data available during fiscal years 1996 through 2000. There are a total of 8,071 company years available. For these companies, we use proxy statements and annual reports to collect detailed data on any loans made during these years to any of the executives covered in the ExecuComp database. We examine a total of 32,453 executive years from 1996 through 2000.
Insider trading data comes from the Ownership Reporting System (ORS) tapes. The database includes the insider's name, the firm's name and cusip, the date ofthe insider trade, the number of shares traded, the insider's title, and the nature ofthe transaction. To identify loan-funded insider purchases, we match insider trades from the ORS tapes with our sample of executive loans made for stock purchase. These loans are often outstanding for multiple years. In total, the number of executive years associated with outstanding loans for share purchases is 722. We are able to match these loan years with actual open market purchases by the insider for 146 executive-year observations."
We require that insider purchases take place in the calendar years that the loan is outstanding. Our reasoning is as follows. Ifa loan is made in 1996, but remains outstanding in 1997 and 1998, an insider purchase in 1998 might in fact be fiinded by the loan. In other words, the insider might have waited to execute the loan-funded purchase, and we do not wish to ignore it. Moreover, it is possible that several insider purchases might be funded by a single executive loan, i.e., the insider might spread his purchasing activity over several years.
Conversely, we assume that ifa loan is not outstanding in a particular year, it has already been repaid or forgiven, and purchases in those years are not loan financed. We lose a number of observations because the insider's acquisition is not classified as an open market transaction.•
•We are able to match loans to executives with trades by these executives using their names, which are provided in both data sources.
'Insiders can purchase stock using private transactions or other non-open market activities. Reporting requirements differ for these transactions and they are not always listed on the ORS.
Our tests are based on the sample of 146 open market insider purchases that occur in years that the insider has an outstanding loan to buy stock. We refer to these purchases simply as loanfunded insider purchases.
We repeat this procedure for insider option exercises fiinded by loans, resulting in 132 such option exercises. We refer to these as loan-funded option exercises.
To understand the effects of executive loans on the profitability of insider purchases or option exercises, we also require a sample of non-loan-funded trades. If loan-funded share acquisitions are truly associated with different insider motives, then insider share acquisitions that are not financed by executive loans will likely exhibit differential profitability. For ease of exposition, our discussion focuses on open market insider purchases. We construct our sample of non-loanfunded option exercises in an analogous manner.
To construct our sample of non-loan-funded purchases, we focus on insider activity in the firms that did not make loans for stock purchases at any time during 1996-2000. We then match each loan-funded purchase with a non-loan-financed purchase peer, chosen to have the same two-digit SIC code, and minimizing the summed absolute percentage deviations in firm size and book-tomarket equity. Using these criteria, we find adequate matches for 117 ofthe 146 purchase loans and 109 ofthe 132 option exercise loans.* Our primary measure of insider profitability is based on market-adjusted returns.' Specifically, the "profit" on each insider trade (loan-funded or peer) is the cumulated value of daily marketadjusted retums (raw retums minus CRSP's value-weighted index retums) over the 250 trading days following the trade.* For each loan-funded insider purchase, we then calculate the adjusted abnormal retum as the market-adjusted retum on the loan-funded trade minus the market-adjusted retum on its non-loan-funded peer. These are referred to as peer-adjusted abnormal retums.
Our approach to measuring insider profits is similar in spirit, but differs in a few details when compared to other studies of insider trading profits. Seyhun (1986) follows a standard market model approach, with estimation ofthe parameters over two windows; one preceding the insider trade, the other following it. However, evidence suggests that insiders tend to sell following share price runups, implying a high market model a which effectively biases the profit measure upward. Altematively, Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000) cumulate abnormal retums where the benchmark is the retum to a portfolio of size and book-to-market equity matched firms. This approach recognizes the empirical influence of firm size and book-to-market equity on retums. However, Barber and Lyon (1997) show that such reference portfolios' retums suffer from rebalancing and skewness differences when compared to the individual firms' retums that they are subtracted from. Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2002) therefore create portfolios of event firms and conduct Fama/French regressions (including Carhart's momentum factor). The intercept from these regressions measures abnonnal profits.
We require individual firm abnormal retum measures for our cross-sectional tests. We eschew the market model approach of Seyhun (1986) because ofthe tendency of insiders to buy (sell) after stock price declines (runups), and calculate individual firm retums as cumulated marketadjusted retums. However, this does not control for the empirical infiuence of firm size and bookto-market equity on retums. We therefore follow Barber and Lyon's (1997) suggestion and carefully choose peers matched on those criteria, as well as industry. This also avoids the rebalancing and skewness issues associated with using a portfolio retum to benchmark.
'Inadequate matches are when the closest peer in terms of size is more than 30% larger or smaller than the sample firm (see Barber and Lyon, 1997) . Relaxation of this criterion does not affect our results.
'See Seyhun (1986) for a discussion ofthe pitfalls to using market model abnormal retums to measure abnormal profits to insider trading. 'Our results are robust to using CRSP's equal-weighted index to proxy market retums. Table I describes firm characteristics for four sub-samples of firms from the overall executive loan sample. The firm characteristics are measured at the end ofthe year preceding the first loan made by that firm to any executive. The four sub-samples are: 1) firms with at least one loan for purchase during the sample period, 2) firms with at least one loan for option exercise during the sample period, 3) firms with no loans for purchase, and 4) firms with no loans for option exercise. Within a share acquisition category (purchase or option exercise), there are a few differences between the loan and no-loan subsamples. We discuss the subsample medians rather than means because a few large values skew the means.
Firms with loans for stock purchase are typically larger than their no-loan counterparts. Median assets for the loan group are $1,005 billion, compared to $664 million for the no loan group. A Wilcoxon signed rank test for differences in the medians rejects the null at the 1% level. Book and market equity are also significantly larger in firms with a loan for stock purchase. Finally, firms with purchase loans also have significantly more shares outstanding. However, there are no significant differences between the two groups of firms in terms of book-to-market ratios. These results suggest caution when comparing the perfonnance of insider trades between the two groups since firm size is a known determinant of stock retums. We attempt to control for this concern through our peer-adjusted retum design.
In contrast to the stock purchase sample, there are few differences between the firms with loans for option exercise and their no-loan counterparts. Only median stock price relative to cash flow and book equity relative to market equity appear to be different across the groups. There are also no differences between the samples in the value ofthe corporate govemance index, as measured by the Corporate Govemance index from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) .' Table II contains descriptive statistics on the market-adjusted retums from insider trading both for share acquisitions funded by executive loans and for acquisitions that are not funded by executive loans, as well as for peer-adjusted retums. The first half of the table examines stock purchases and the second half examines option exercises.
III. Results

A. Differences in Profits to Loan-Funded versus Non-Loan-Funded Purchases
Insider purchases that are funded by executive loans eam significantly positive returns over the 250 trading days following the purchase, on average. The mean market-adjusted retum to the sample of 146 purchases is 17.6%, which is significant at the 1 % level. The corresponding median value is 18.25%, which is also significant at the 1% level. Insider purchases not financed by executive loans eam larger market-adjusted retums. The mean 250 trading day profit is 54.8% while the median is 44.3%; both are significant at the 1% level.
The difference in the profitability of insider purchases that are loan funded and those that are not (our peer-adjusted abnormal retums) is confirmed in the third column of Table II . The mean peer-adjusted retum is -28.5%, which is significant at the 1% level. Loan-funded purchases are associated with significantly lower profits than their non-loan-financed counterparts. The median differential profit is -2.2%, which is significant at the 1% level according to a signed rank test.
'However, it can be argued that governance indices might not be a usefiil measure of govemance quality since they double count some items and do not allow for the distinctions between mechanisms that substitute for one another versus those that are complements in organization design.
Table I. Descriptive Statistics for Firms Making Executive Loans
This table presents descriptive statistics for firms making executive loans, at the end ofthe year associated with the first loan. Ifa firm has no loan, data are from the first year between 1996-2000 for which data is available on ExecuComp. Size is total assets; Book Equity is the book value of equity; Price/CF is the stock price divided by cash flow per share; Shares Out is the number of shares outstanding; Market Equity is the market value of equity; Book/Market is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity; Govemance is the govemance index from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) . Larger values of Govemance Index imply govemance structure that is less favorable towards outside shareholders. The peer-adjusted retum results confirm that insider purchases financed by executive loans are atypical. The lower profits to these purchases strongly suggest that insiders are less interested in timing these trades based on private information. There are three potential explanations for this result. First, the firm might simply discourage buying before good news when they lend money for purchases. Altematively, the firm might be experiencing poor stock performance and wish to signal a tum-around via insider buying activity. They finance this purchase, but the poor performance continues. Third, insiders that receive loans for purchases might feel that they are "playing with someone else's money," implying less ofa need to profit from this trade. While we cannot prove that one explanation dominates the others, we present evidence below that is consistent with the third possibility.
Variable Name
In the last two rows of Table II , we examine the mnup prior to the purchase and the number of shares purchased. Although there is no significant difference in runup between the two samples, loan-financed insider purchases are typically for a larger number of shares. The mean number of shares purchased is nearly 56,000 and the median is approximately 10,000. For non-loan-funded purchases, the average number of shares purchased is 8,418 and the median is 4,100. Only the median result is significant.
Table II. Insider Purchases and Option Exercises, Financed by Executive Loans and Otherwise
This table presents descriptive statistics for insider purchases that are financed by executive loans and peers that are not. Peers are matched by two-digit SIC code, size, and book-to-market equity. Abnormal Retum is the cumulated 250 day market-adjusted retum over [t+1, t+250] where t is the insider trading date and the market retum is proxied by the CRSP value-weighted index. The peer-adjusted abnormal retum is the market-adjusted retum on the loan-fiinded trade minus the market-adjusted retum on its non-loan-funded peer. Runup is the cumulated 250 day market-adjusted retum over [t-250, t-l] . Shares Purchased is the number of shares bought by the insider in the transaction. Cell values are means. Numbers in brackets are medians. The test of median difference from zero is the signed rank test.
Abnormal Retum
Shares Purchased
LoanFunded (N=146)
. The last three columtis of Table II repeat the results for optioti exercises. As in the stock purchase results, option exercises funded by loans are less profitable. The mean peer-adjusted abnormal retum is -48.4%, while the median peer-adjusted abnormal retum is -40.98%. Both are significant at the 1 % level.
As in the purchase sample, there is no significant difference in runup prior to the exercise between the two samples. However, option exercises financed by loans are typically for a larger number of shares. The mean difference in shares obtained is 34,500, which is significant at the 1% level. The median difference is only 3,554 shares, but this is still significant at the 1% level.
B. Determinants of Differential Profits
The differential profits to loan-funded and non-loan-funded stock acquisitions begs the question of why. This section examines whether the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that insiders believe they are not risking their own wealth in these transactions. We begin with univariate examinations of differential profits, categorized by whether the loan is forgivable, repaid, or secured. We follow with multivariate tests that illustrate the marginal contribution of each category.
Univariate Results
Table III presents statistics on the peer-adjusted abnormal retums to insider purchases and option exercises, categorized by variables that are likely to affect the insiders' incentives to trade This table presents means and tests of significance on peer-adjusted abnonnal retums, categorized by the characteristics of the loan. The peer-adjusted abnonnal retum is the abnonnal retum eamed on the loanfunded insider trade minus the abnormal retum eamed on non-loan-financed peer trades. Abnormal retums are the cumulated 250 day market-adjusted retums over [t+1, t+250] where t is the insider trading date and the market retum is proxied by the CRSP value-weighted index. Peers are matched by two-digit SIC code, size, and book-to-market equity. Repaid: Equals zero if the loan was not repaid (by the time this data was collected), equals one if the loan was repaid.
Loan Characteristics
Secured: Equals zero if the loan was unsecured, and one if it was secured by stock.
The first rows in Table III indicate that forgivable loans (both principal and interest) finance insider purchases that eam significantly smaller peer-adjusted retums than non-forgivable loans. The average peer-adjusted abnormal retums for the sub-sample with forgive equal to one is -75.05%, significant at the 1% level. By contrast, non-forgivable loans to fund insider purchases are associated with peer-adjusted abnormal retums of-19.44%. The difference between the two groups is statistically significant at the 1% level. We examine the effects of interest only forgiveness on our results in the multivariate analysis below.
Apparently, forgivable loans lead insiders to trade less on private profitable infonnation than is typical. This is consistent with our earlier argument that insiders might view forgivable loanfunded purchases as "playing with other people's money" and therefore might not require as high profits. The other two potential explanations for differential profits to loan-funded purchases do not suggest that the effect will be concentrated among forgivable loans.'" We confirm the above intuition by examining peer-adjusted abnormal retums for repaid versus non-repaid loans to fund purchases. Here, the vast majority of loans are not repaid as of the collection date, according to our data." Repaid loans are associated with positive peer-adjusted abnormal retums. This implies that the loan-financed insider purchases are followed by larger market-adjusted retums than the non-loan-financed peer insider purchases. By contrast, non-repaid loans are associated with significantly negative peer-adjusted abnormal retums. The difference in the two peer-adjusted abnormal retums is statistically significant at the 0.13% level. If insiders can accurately forecast which loans will have to be repaid, this evidence supports the hypothesis that loan-funded purchases yield smaller profits because insiders believe they are not risking their own wealth in the transaction. Altematively, it is possible that the reason the loan has not been repaid is because the stock has performed poorly, and the executive's wealth has been adversely affected.
Table III also indicates that unsecured loans are at the heart ofthe underperformance of loanfinanced insider purchases. Loans secured by stock have peer-adjusted retums that are negative, but not significant. In contrast, unsecured loans are associated with peer-adjusted abnormal retums that are significantly negative. The difference in the two peer-adjusted abnormal retums is statistically significant at the 6.17% level. One interpretation of this result is that insiders perceive secured loans as more likely to require repayment, necessitating reasonable return perfonnance. As we show in the multivariate results, the marginal effect ofthe security status is negligible when we control for whether the loan is repaid.
Panel B of Table III examines the determinants of profitability for option exercises. We find that the retums to options exercises are significantly negative, regardless of whether the loan is forgivable, repaid, or secured. However, the magnitude ofthe retums is much more negative for the forgivable loans than for the non-forgivable loans. Specifically, the average peer-adjusted abnormal retum is -91.13% for the forgivable sample in contrast to -36.97% for the non-forgivable sample. The difference in the two peer-adjusted abnormal retums is statistically significant at the 2.27% level.
Overall, our results support the idea that the poor performance of loan-financed insider share acquisitions is driven by the insiders' view that these trades do not involve risk to their own wealth.
Multivariate Results
We next examine the marginal contributions of loan forgiveness, repayment and security status on peer-adjusted abnormal retums in a multivariate framework. Table IV presents results from three regressions. We include two additional control variables that are specific to the insider making the loan-funded purchase: the amount of restricted stock held (restricted stock %) and the number of shares owned (share own %), both scaled by shares outstanding. Models I and II '"There is a causation issue here. The loan could be forgiven ex-post in response to poor performance. " It is possible that firms did not report that the loan was repaid or they have not yet requested repayment but plan to in the future. Finally, categorizing on the basis of future actual repayment presumes that insiders can accurately forecast whether repayment will be necessary, when the loan is originally made. Therefore, we believe the results using the forgivable characteristic are more representative of insiders' motivations, and simply present the repayment results for robustness.
Table IV. Multivariate Determinants of Abnorhial H^eturns
This table presents regressions of the determinants of abnormal returns. In the first two regressions, the abnormal retum is the peer-adjusted abnormal retum (the abnormal returri eamed on the loan-funded insider trade minus the abnormal retum eamed on non-loan-funded peer trades). Abnonnal retums are the cumulated 250 day market-adjusted retums over [t+1, t+250] where t is the insider trading date and the market retum is proxied by the CRSP value-weighted index. The final column is for insider purchases with the average profit from all non-loan-funded purchases as "control." Forgivable Interest & Principal equals one if both interest and principal are forgivable, and zero otherwise. Forgivable Interest Only equals one if only interest is forgivable, and zero otherwise. Repaid equals one ifloan is repaid (by date of data collection), and zero otherwise. Secured equals zero ifloan is unsecured, and one ifloan is secured by stock. Restricted Stock % is the number of shares of restricted stock the insider holds, scaled by shares outstanding. Share Own % is the total number of shares the insider owns, scaled by shares outstanding. examine peer-adjusted retums for stock purchases and option exercises, respectively. Model 111 differs from model I in the construction ofthe dependent variable: it is the retum on loan-funded insider purchases minus the average retum from all non-loan-funded purchases.
The estimates from model I confirm that forgivable loans are associated with poorer peeradjusted abnormal retums than their non-forgivable counterparts^ while repaid loans are associated with better performance than their non-repaid counterparts. The coefficient on forgive (repaid) is negative (positive) and significant, with a t-statistic of-3.18 (2.20). The coefficient on secured is not significant.
The control variables are not important determinants of the peer-adjusted abnormal retums. The overall regression is significant (at the 1% level) and we are able to explain a large amount ofthe cross-sectional variation in differential profits to loan-funded insider purchases (adjusted R^ = .126). A test of homoskedastic standard errors is rejected with 90% confidence (p-value = .07).
All of our conclusions hold when we calculate t-statistics using White's (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
The results for model I in Table IV are based on peer-adjusted abnormal returns. One problem with this approach is that our sample is limited to 117 observations. Therefore, we re-examine whether there is an association between the profitability of insider purchases and the financing mode of the purchases, for a sample of 7,706 observations that includes all firms, all insiders and all purchases during the period from 1996 to 2000. For this sample we run a multivariate regression with the dependent variable being the market-adjusted return over the 250 trading days following the insider purchase. The independent variables are based on results in Jeng (1999) and Lemmon (2000, 2002) and are as follows: a dummy variable equal to one if the insider purchase was financed with an executive loan (Loanbuy), the beta from a market model regression over the window starting 200 days and ending 51 days before the date of the insider purchase (Beta), the cumulative raw retum over the window starting 250 days and ending one day before the date of the insider purchase (Runup), the natural log of the firm's bookto-market equity ratio at the end of the fiscal year preceding the insider purchase (BM), and the natural log of the firm's market value of equity at the end of the calendar year preceding the insider purchase (ME), a dummy variable equal to one if the insider is the CEO, President, or Chairman of the Board (Topexec), a dummy variable equal to one if the insider is an officer but not a top executive (Officer), a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the insider is a Director but not an officer (Director), the standard deviation of firm stock returns over the period starting 250 days and ending one day before the insider trade date (Sdret), and a dummy variable equal to one if the insider purchase was in the typical allowed window after an earnings announcement.'^ The results are reported in Table V . The second column presents the results without dummy variables for SIC codes while the results in the third column are from regressions that include dummy variables for SIC codes.
The results in Table V indicate that the profitability of insider trades increases with firm systematic risk (beta) and the book-to-market equity ratio, and decreases with firm size, whether the insider is a Director, and whether the trade takes place in the allowed window. In addition, consistent with model I of Table IV, the larger sample indicates that insider purchases financed with company loans are less profitable than those that are not loan-financed.
Returning to Table IV, model II replicates the analysis in model I for the sample of option exercises. Here, we see that forgivable loans, repaid loans, and secured loans are all associated with poorer differential performance. The forgivable loans result is in line with what we see for open market insider purchases. The latter two results differ. One possible explanation for the difference is that option exercises need not always result in a net acquisition of shares. Insiders might choose to sell the shares obtained through option exercise on the open market. In our robustness checks, we control for this possibility and find that loan-funded option exercises that definitively increase insider shareholdings are similar to loan-funded open market purchases. Finally, we see that insiders with higher restricted stock holdings perform worse on a differential (relative to non-loan-funded purchases) basis."
Model III re-examines the results for insider purchases, with the average profit from all nonloan-fiinded purchases as the "control." As in model I, we find that loans with forgivable interest and principal are associated with worse performance. However, in model III, secured loans are '^This period is {t+3, t+12}, where t is the earnings announcement date. See Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000) for more details.
"We also seleet loan-funded option exereises that definitively increase insider holdings and examine whether their profits differ from all other option exercises using a regression similar to the one reported above. The coefficient on the loanbuy dummy is again significantly negative (t = -2.15).
Table V. Multivariate Determinants of Market Adjusted Returns
This table presents regressions of market-adjusted returns on the following variables: Loanbuy=l ifthe insider purchased shares with executive loan financing; Beta is the firm's market model beta calculated over [-200, -51] where 0 is the insider trade date; Runup is the cumulative raw retum to the firm over [-250, -1] ; log(B/M) is the natural log of the book equity to market equity ratio; log(ME) is the natural log of firm market value of equity; Topexec=l ifthe insider is either the CEO, President, or Chairman of the board, and zero otherwise; Officer=l ifthe insider is an officer but not top executive, and zero otherwise; Director=l if the insider is a director but not officer, and zero otherwise; Sdret is the standard deviation of firm stock returns over [-250, -1] ; DumAllow=l ifthe insider purchase was in the typical allowed window for trading after an earnings announcement [t+3, t+12] where t is the earnings date (see Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon, 2000) . SIC code dummies are for the first digit of the SIC code. T-statistics are in parentheses.
Variable Included
No SIC Code Dummies SIC Code Dummies associated with better perfonnance, as are higher insider holditigs of restricted stock. These differences from the model I results would seem to be due to the use of control firms that are not as closely matched to loan-fiinded insider purchase fitros as the peers.
C.The Relation Between Insider Purchases and Pay-Performance Sensitivity
One possible reason for providing loans to insiders for purchasing stock and exercising options is that it is an additional mechanism, beyond stock and option grants/repricing, to move an executive quickly to a target level of incentives. In this section we provide a direct test of this hypothesis.''' Specifically, we use the Core and Guay (1999) methodology to estimate the deviation of the actual pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) from the target level, i.e., we estimate the residual PPS. A positive (negative) residual implies that the actual PPS is higher (lower) than the benchmark level. We examine these residuals in both the year before and the year of the insider purchase and then analyze whether loan-financed insider purchases result in a change in residual PPS. As stated in Hypothesis 3, we expect insiders who are awarded loans to have negative residual PPS prior to the awarding of the loan.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table VI . Panel A presents the mean and median residual PPS in the year before the insider purchase, while panel B presents the corresponding results for the year of the insider purchase. As can be seen from the table, in the year prior to the loan-funded insider purchases, insiders that execute the loan-funded purchase have a negative residual PPS, while the residual PPS for executives who do not have a loan-fianded purchase is approximately zero. In contrast, in the year of the loan-fianded purchase, the residual PPS for insiders that execute the loanfijnded purchase is positive and significantly higher than the residual PPS for executives who do not have a loan-funded purchase. This suggests that the loan-funded purchase moves the average executive to a significantly more positive PPS and supports our hypothesis that loan-financed insider purchases are an additional method to move an executive quickly to a target level of incentives.
D. Robustness
Until now, our treatment of option exercises as share acquisitions assumes that insiders exercise the options and keep the shares acquired on exercise, thus increasing their ownership in the firm. However, this need not be the case. Some options exercises are followed by open market insider sales.'' In fact, loan financing might impact the likelihood that this happens. Since loan financing of option exercises helps defray the insider's out-of-pocket expense, it might reduce the need to sell shares obtained through the option exercise to help pay taxes due or exercise costs. Alternatively, ifthe loan is designed to increase the manager's pay-performance sensitivity, sales following the exercise would defeat this purpose and might be restricted.
In Panel A of Table VII , we examine a contingency table relating the incidence of open market insider sales (OMIS) within one year of option exercise to whether the option exercise was loanfunded or not. There are 154 loan-funded option exercises (without regard to other data availability) and 18,688 non-loan-funded option exercises. The null hypothesis is that loan funding of the option exercise and the incidence of open market insider sale are independent.
The test statistic from the contingency table equals 3.48. This implies rejection of the null hypothesis with better than 90% confidence (the critical value for 90% confidence is 2.706). This result provides some evidence that loan funding of option exercise, and whether the insider sells shares within one year after the option exercise, are not independent. Examining the actual and expected numbers (which are in brackets and are based on the null hypothesis of independence) suggests that loan-funded option exercises are less likely than non-loan-funded option exercises to have an open market insider sale within a year following the exercise.
The above result implies two countervailing effects that might impact our previous results on the relation between loan repayment and peer-adjusted returns following option exercises. In particular, loan financing reduces the incentive of the insider to eam significant peer-adjusted returns because of the reduced wealth at risk. However, it also raises the incentive to eam excess ' ••We thank the referee for this suggestion. '^Chen and Zhao (2005) provide evidence that option exercises followed by stock sales contain different information than stand-alone option exercises.
Table VI. Loan-Funded Insider Purchases and Pay-Performance Sensitivity
This table presents results from comparing residuals of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) from executiveyears that either contained or did not contain loan-funded insider purchases. PPS is calculated using the method outlined in Core and Guay (1999) Table VII do not control for the effects of firm-specific characteristics on the incidence of open market insider sales following an option exercise. To control for factors such as firm size, book-to-market ratio and price to cash flow, we run a logistic regression with these variables as controls. The results are presented in Panel B of Table VII. The sample for the logistic regression is all 154 loan-funded option exercises and a subset of the non-loan-flinded option exercises. In Panel A, the sample of non-loan-funded option exercises was all option exercises by insiders in firms that never have loan funding for option exercises during the sample period. We do not use all of the latter observations in the logit since the number of ones (loan funding) in the dependent variable would be vastly outnumbered by the number of zeroes (no loan funding).'Î nstead, we choose a subset of non-loan-funded option exercises made by insiders in a matched sample. As usual, the matching is on two-digit SIC code, size, and book-to-market equity. Matching restrictions led to 101 matched pairs of loan-funded and non-loan-fianded option exercises. Of these, 59 matched pairs had an open market insider sale within one year of the option exercise; the other 42 did not. The sample is smaller (101 versus 109) than in Tables II through IV because of the additional data requirements to calculate the total assets and price to cash flow control variables.
To run the logit, we stack the individual observations from each matched pair. In other words, each pair has a loan-funded option exercise and a non-loan-funded option exercise. These are treated as separate observations. The logit has 202 observations: 101 loan-funded and 101 nonloan-funded. Among these 202 observations, some are option exercises that are followed by an open market insider sale within one year (118), and others are not (84). "Palepu (1986) discusses the tradeoff between using a sample with an equal representation of ones and zeros for the dependent variable and using a full but unbalanced sample. Since the purpose of our regression is solely to determine whether loan financing is associated with the probability of an open market insider sale following the option exercise, we do not use the Palepu (1986) correction. The constant term is the only parameter affected by this correction. If we were to use the regression to classify firms into those predicted to have open market sales versus those not, then it would be necessary to make an appropriate correction to the intercept to avoid any bias. The dependent variable equals one ifthe option exercise is followed by an open market insider sale within one year, and equals zero otherwise. The key independent variable is whether the option exercise is loan funded or not. Other independent variables include log(total assets), log(tnarket value of equity), book-to-market equity and price to cash flow. The results indicate "This result also supports our hypothesis that loans help to increase the PPS for the insider.
In Table VIU, we rerun the basic regression from Table IV on the pooled samples of open market purchases and option exercises that are not followed by open market insider sales, where both samples are loan financed. By sampling only on situations when we know the insider acquired shares, we control for one side of the countervailing effects noted above. Specifically, the increase in shares and concomitant greater incentive to eam excess retums is built into the sample. Therefore, the effect of loan financing, especially forgivable and/or not repaid, is to strictly reduce the incentive to eam excess retums. Models I and II differ only by the inclusion of a dummy variable equal to one if the observation is an open market insider purchase, and equal to zero if it is an option exercise (Purchase Dummy).
The results mirror those in Table IV . Forgivable loan-funded share acquisitions are associated with worse peer-adjusted abnormal retums than non-forgivable ones. Also, when loans for share acquisition are not repaid, excess retums are lower than when the loan is repaid. Both results suggest that insiders recognize when their wealth is not at risk and have less incentive to trade on inside information.'* Finally, differential profits are higher when the share acquisition is through an open market purchase.
IV. Conclusion
The literature on signaling via insider trading is well established. However, prior studies view the typical insider transaction as an attempt to profit from private information. This supposition might be premature, but it has often been difficult to distinguish trades that are more versus less likely to represent such attempts. We examine insider trades financed by company loans. If such loans result in insiders assuming that they are less likely to be risking their own wealth, they might feel less need to eam significant profits on such trades. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that loan-financed insider purchases are followed by less positive market-adjusted retums in the year following the trade than a set of matched peers. This result suggests different motives to insider purchases financed by executive loans. We find similar results for loan-financed option exercises when compared to their non-loan-financed counterparts.
We also find that the poorer retum perfomiance to loan-financed purchases is driven by forgivable loans and loans that are not repaid. These findings support our argument that insiders view loan-financed purchases as not warranting trading on private information. In contrast, poorer performance on loan-financed option exercises is associated with loans that are repaid. We investigate further and find that option exercises that are not followed by insider sales (i.e., those that are associated with increases in shareholdings) more closely resemble straight open market insider purchases. We argue that loan financing of option exercises has countervailing effects. It reduces the likelihood of a subsequent open market insider sale because the loan defrays the insider's out-of-poeket costs. The subsequent increase in shareholdings due to the option exercise reduces the insider's diversification and raises the incentive to eam excess retums. However, loan financing in and of itself reduces the amount of wealth the insider perceives to be at risk, and therefore reduces the incentive to eam excess retums.
Finally, we find that in the year prior to loan-funded insider purchases, insiders that execute the loan-funded purchase have a negative residual PPS, while the residual PPS for executives who do not have a loan-funded purchase is approximately zero. In contrast, in the year of the loanfinanced purchase, the average executive who executes a loan-financed purchase has a positive "This result is also consistent with insiders not repaying loans ifthe stock price falls.
Table Vlll. Multivariate Determinants of Abnormal Returns
This table presents regressions of peer-adjusted abnormal retums for the combined sample of insider purchases and option exercises that were not followed by open market insider sales within one year. The peer-adjusted abnormal retum is the abnormal retum eamed on loan-funded insider trade minus the abnormal retum eamed on the non-loan-funded peer trades. Abnormal retums are the cumulated 250 day market-adjusted retums over [t+l, t+250] where t is the insider trading date and the market retum is proxied by the CRSP value-weighted index. Peers are matched by two-digit SIC code, size, and book-to-market equity. Forgivable Interest & Principal equals one if both interest and principal are forgivable, and zero otherwise. Forgivable Interest Only equals one if only interest is forgivable, and zero otherwise. Repaid equals one if loan is repaid (by date of data collection), and zero otherwise. Secured equals zero if loan is unsecured, and one if loan is secured by stock. Restricted Stock % is the number of shares of restricted stock the insider holds, scaled by shares outstanding. Share Own % is the total number of shares the insider owns, scaled by shares outstanding. Purchase Dummy equals one ifthe observation is an open market insider purchase, and zero if it is an option exercise. residual PPS that is significantly higher than that of the average executive that does not purchase stock with a loan. This suggests that loan-financed insider purchases are an additional method to move an executive quickly to a target level of incentives, and that they are not necessarily indicative of agency problems in the firm. One concern with the applicability of our study is that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) makes it unlawful for any public company to provide loans to its executive officers and directors. Although this Act contains a few exemptions, it generally proscribes the type of activity that we study. However, while SOX bans new loans, this does not detract from the general interest of examining insider trades that are more or less likely to contain inside information. In addition, loans made prior to July 30, 2002 were "grandfathered" and could be outstanding for years. Finally, the U.S. General Accounting Office, Congress's investigative aim, has requested empirical evidence pertaining to the Act, and we believe our paper provides this.B
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